Working Papers

Seria wydawnicza WNE WORKING PAPERS prowadzona jest przez WNE UW od 2008 r. i jak dotąd opublikowano w niej ponad 400 prac.

Seria WNE Working Papers służy szybkiemu upowszechnianiu wyników badań prowadzonych na Wydziale Nauk Ekonomicznych UW. Publikowane tu teksty mają charakter wersji roboczych (pre-printów): mogą być uzupełniane lub poprawiane w miarę postępu prac nad tekstem i procesu wydawniczego. Prezentujemy aktualną wersję udostępnioną przez autorów, opatrzoną datą oraz identyfikatorami DOI/ISSN – co ułatwia jej cytowanie i śledzenie kolejnych iteracji. Każdy dokument zachowuje pełne prawa autorskie swoich twórców, a w przypadku późniejszych zmian, autorzy mogą w dowolnym momencie zamieścić zaktualizowany plik lub wskazać miejsce ostatecznego wydania.

Do serii WORKING PAPERS przyjmowane są artykuły pracowników naukowych WNE UW oraz publikacje z konferencji organizowanych na WNE UW. Artykuły powinny dotyczyć ekonomii, mieć charakter oryginalnych prac badawczych, nie być wcześniej publikowane. Przyjmowane są wyłącznie teksty w języku angielskim.

Prace prosimy przesyłać e-mailem na adres: !6^[C.0oqKD/dQaj\mWTh$wu{Nk]#[w$QG&wr`S8$|XhYYBvMLqf\k*?X

Prosimy przesyłać dwa pliki:

(1) główny tekst bez podania tytułu artykułu oraz autorów (plik DOC/DOCX) oraz

(2) stronę tytułową zawierającą: tytuł opracowania, autorów oraz ich afiliację (plik DOC/DOCX). 

Przed przesłaniem tekstu prosimy zapoznać się z szczegółowymi wymogami edycyjnymi.

Redaktorem wydawniczym serii Working Papers jest dr Maciej Bukowski.

Ilość wyników 5

WP(26/2026)520. An Eye for an Eye – The Study of Negative Reciprocity. Evidence From a Game Show

Autorzy: Starzykowska Natalia
The proposed research is an attempt to analyse the tendency to take a revenge revealed by the participants in the television program "Ten to One" and its relationship with gender, education, and demographic variables of a player. Choices ma…

WP520. An Eye for an Eye – The Study of Negative Reciprocity. Evidence From a Game Show

The proposed research is an attempt to analyse the tendency to take a revenge revealed by the participants in the television program "Ten to One" and its relationship with gender, education, and demographic variables of a player. Choices made by participants consist of indication of a participant who will answer the next question. Since this reduces the ones probability of winning the episode, the feedback can be considered as a negative reciprocity or simply: revenge.


DOI: https://doi.org/10.33138/2957-0506.2026.26.520
Starzykowska Natalia
gender discrimination negative reciprocity reciprocity

WP(15/2017)244. Belief-based and taste-based gender discrimination. Evidence from a game show

Autorzy: Krawczyk Michał, Starzykowska Natalia
Gender discrimination, based on taste or on perception of competence, remains to be a likely contributor to females' lower wages and slower professional advancement. In this project we use a novel data set of decisions made by participants of the…

WP244. Belief-based and taste-based gender discrimination. Evidence from a game show

Gender discrimination, based on taste or on perception of competence, remains to be a likely contributor to females' lower wages and slower professional advancement. In this project we use a novel data set of decisions made by participants of the Ten to One TV show. During the game, contestants repeatedly nominate the next person to answer a question. Being nominated reduces one's probability of eventually winning the game. General tendency to nominate one gender more often than the other signifies taste-based discrimination against this gender. The construction of the game makes it relatively more profitable to nominate the most competent rather than the least competent opponents in some strategic circumstances, which allows to identify biased perception of the two genders' competence. Having analyzed over 6000 decisions from 117 episodes aired in the last 21 years we find clear evidence of belief-based discrimination against females, yet taste-based in favor of them.


DOI: https://doi.org/10.26405/WP/WNE/2017/244/015
Krawczyk Michał, Starzykowska Natalia
taste-based discrimination belief-based discrimination gender games

WP(11/2014)128. Gender Wage Gap in Poland ? Can It Be Explained by Differences in Observable Characteristics?

Autorzy: Goraus-Tańska Karolina, Tyrowicz Joanna
The raw gender wage gap over the period 1995-2012 amounts to app. 9% of hourly wage and is fairly stable. However, the raw gap does not account for differences in endowments between genders. In fact, the adjusted wage gap amounts to as much as 20% on…

WP128. Gender Wage Gap in Poland ? Can It Be Explained by Differences in Observable Characteristics?

The raw gender wage gap over the period 1995-2012 amounts to app. 9% of hourly wage and is fairly stable. However, the raw gap does not account for differences in endowments between genders. In fact, the adjusted wage gap amounts to as much as 20% on average over the analyzed period and shows some cyclical properties. The estimates of adjusted gender wage gap do not seem to exhibit any long-term trends, which suggest that in general neither demographic changes nor the progressing transition underlie the phenomenon of unequal pay for the same work among men and women.


Goraus-Tańska Karolina, Tyrowicz Joanna
Wage gap discrimination decomposition Oaxaca-Blinder N?po non-parametric estimation

WP(16/2013)101. How to perfectly discriminate in a crowd? A theoretical model of crowdfunding.

Autorzy: Hardy Wojciech
This paper proposes a theoretical framework to capture the underlying mechanisms of the innovative online crowdfunding. The goal of this work is to emphasize the advantages of crowdfunding platforms over traditional methods of sale, by describing the…

WP101. How to perfectly discriminate in a crowd? A theoretical model of crowdfunding.

This paper proposes a theoretical framework to capture the underlying mechanisms of the innovative online crowdfunding. The goal of this work is to emphasize the advantages of crowdfunding platforms over traditional methods of sale, by describing the capabilities unique to such model and processes stemming from them. Namely, the producer's chance for perfect discrimination is discussed, as well as the contributor's role and his decision dilemma. Numerous extensions to the model provide additional insight into crowdfunding platforms.


Hardy Wojciech
crowdfunding strategic fundraising innovation Kickstarter complete discrimination pay what you want

WP(8/2009)18. Labour Market Racial Discrimination in South Africa Revisited

Autorzy: Szelewicki Maciej, Tyrowicz Joanna
Discrimination is a significant issue in labour market economics across developed as well as developing countries. In this paper we inquire the actual size of wage discrimination in the Republic of Soutn Africa, accounting for large differences in in…

WP18. Labour Market Racial Discrimination in South Africa Revisited

Discrimination is a significant issue in labour market economics across developed as well as developing countries. In this paper we inquire the actual size of wage discrimination in the Republic of Soutn Africa, accounting for large differences in individual endowments. We apply the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as well as propensity score matching to adequately determine the role of discrimination in the wage gaps observed. Although the size of the absolute racial wage gap is enormous, amounting for more than 500%, the actual estimated effect non-attributable to other factors ranges between 45%-55%. This estimator, however, assumes homogenous discrimination across the wage distribution, while data suggest that there are significant educational, sectoral and occupational differentials. To account for these effects, we implement propensity score matching by finding 'statistical twins' of the White population among the Black population, thus we demonstrate how wages differ between these groups in comparable labour market situations. Here too we find that wages for the White are on average approximately 30%, while the effects vary at quartiles of the wage distribution.


Szelewicki Maciej, Tyrowicz Joanna
discrimination Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition propensity score matching Republic of South Africa racial wage gap
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