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Intra-Household Relative Income and Happiness: The Role of Unpaid Work Division During COVID and Afterwards

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Abstract: Rising female employment and earnings have transformed partners' economic positions, while gender divisions in unpaid labor persist. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the organization of paid and unpaid work, opening a window to reassess these two dimensions within couples. Using longitudinal panel data from Poland (2021–2024), this paper examines how relative income and the division of unpaid labor relate to both life satisfaction and partner satisfaction among partnered adults. Random-effects models reveal distinct gendered patterns. For men, these dynamics are associated primarily with global life satisfaction: men report higher life satisfaction when they out-earn their partners, but substantially lower life satisfaction when they are out-earned and primarily responsible for domestic work. For women, effects concentrate in partner satisfaction: women who out-earn their partners report lower partner satisfaction when they also perform most domestic labor. These patterns hold for both housework and childcare and are observed primarily in the post-pandemic period.

Keywords: relative income, unpaid labor division, subjective well-being, intra-couple income distribution, Poland

JEL codes: I31, J12, J16, D13

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1. Introduction

Across developed societies, despite historic gains in female education and employment, romantic partnerships remain marked by persistent structural earning imbalances, with women's earnings still averaging roughly one-third of total household income (Gihleb et al. 2024). Even across European countries, where Central and Eastern European together with Scandinavian nations exhibit relatively high female income shares, the proportion of female-breadwinner households remains below 50% (Klesment and Van Bavel 2017; Mysíková 2016). Simultaneously, cross-national research consistently confirms an unequal division of unpaid labor within households, with women performing a disproportionate share of domestic work, particularly in families with children (Kan et al. 2011; Pailhé et al. 2021). While historical trends point to a gradual gender convergence, this shift has been driven primarily by women reducing their domestic hours rather than men significantly increasing theirs, resulting in an uneven progress plateau across nations (Altintas and Sullivan 2016; Kan et al. 2022). Furthermore, domestic labor remains strictly task-segregated: women shoulder routine, inflexible, and time-intensive chores like cooking and cleaning, whereas men engage in non-routine, flexible, and more enjoyable activities (Brini et al. 2022; Carlson et al. 2022; Kan et al. 2011).

Gender earning imbalances attract attention in the context of income comparisons and their role in shaping subjective well-being (SWB) (Duesenberry 1949; Festinger 1954). While comparisons to external peers, neighbors, or coworkers typically yield negative income-comparison effects, intra-household evaluations involving a romantic partner operate through a far more complex mechanism, as spouses jointly consume pooled resources while navigating internal relationship dynamics and union stability (Gash and Plagnol 2021; Magda et al. 2024). Theoretical perspectives remain divided on how this internal dynamic shapes well-being: relative income theory posits that out-earning one's partner elevates individual financial satisfaction (Eirich and Robinson 2017), whereas gender-norm frameworks argue that violating male-breadwinner expectations creates status inconsistency that imposes psychological costs and damages marital quality (Gash and Plagnol 2021; Gong 2007; Hajdu and Hajdu 2018). As a result, intra-household relative income influences multiple SWB domains and long-term partnership outcomes (Magda et al. 2024). Crucially, however, relative earnings represent only one dimension of household equity, making it essential to examine how income disparities interact with the division of unpaid domestic labor.

The COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns created a unique "forced experiment" in gender equality, as widespread telecommuting and school closures compelled many fathers to absorb more housework and caregiving duties (Alon et al. 2020; Carli 2020). Crucially, mandatory

co-presence at home granted partners direct visibility into daily domestic burdens and the full, or even excessive, volume of unpaid care (Carlson et al. 2022; Craig and Churchill 2021; Pabilonia and Vernon 2023). This heightened visibility and initial narrowing of the domestic gap elevated maternal satisfaction with labor division across several countries (Petts et al. 2023) and enabled couples who successfully rebalanced their responsibilities to reach a new, more egalitarian equilibrium that protected relationship satisfaction (Vignoli et al. 2025). Yet, despite these localized gains, the total volume of domestic labor expanded dramatically during lockdowns, with mothers absorbing the majority of the additional caregiving burden (Andrew et al. 2022; Del Boca et al. 2020; Yavorsky et al. 2021).

The aim of this article is to evaluate the role of intra-household income comparisons on both life satisfaction and partner satisfaction and test whether these relationships are moderated by the division of unpaid labor (housework and childcare). While previous research has largely examined relative income (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2015) and the division of unpaid labor (e.g., Ruppanner et al. 2018) as isolated predictors of SWB, this study bridges these two bodies of literature using longitudinal data spanning the pandemic and post-pandemic recovery. Examining this transition provides a unique opportunity to evaluate how heightened domestic visibility during the crisis compares with post-pandemic realities to shape relationship dynamics over time.

To examine these dynamics, Poland provides a compelling institutional and cultural setting, presenting a distinct friction between rapid economic modernization and persistent traditional gender roles. Characterized by high female educational attainment (Eurostat 2026; GUS 2023), where 57% of women aged 30–34 hold a tertiary degree compared to 39% of men (European Institute for Gender Equality 2023), and a post-socialist legacy of high female labor force participation, there is an unspoken expectation for Polish women to contribute significantly to household income (Pascall and Manning 2000; Treas and Widmer 2000). Crucially, whereas part-time employment is widely utilized in Western Europe, the Polish labor market offers few part-time options and limited schedule flexibility, compelling most employed women into full-time roles (Magda 2020; Magda et al. 2024). However, despite this gender gap in tertiary education, women still face wage gaps and occupational segregation (Goraus-Tańska et al. 2026). Simultaneously, institutional and market constraints hamper household capacity to outsource domestic responsibilities. Public childcare for young children remains scarce (Robila 2012; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008) and an underdeveloped market for domestic services makes outsourcing housework difficult (Farvaque 2015). Consequently, many Polish women face an acute double burden of full-time employment and primary domestic care

(Martín-García and Solera 2022), with time-use data showing that Polish women spend about two hours more per day on household and family care than men (Statistics Poland 2024). This unique structural juxtaposition of high female economic capability, minimal domestic outsourcing options, and persistent male breadwinner expectations makes Poland an ideal case for testing how relative income and unpaid labor division shape the SWB of both women and men.

This work advances the literature in four key ways. First, we operationalize unpaid labor as an explicit moderator of the relative income–satisfaction relationship, capturing compound normative disruptions such as the double burden borne by primary-earning women and the identity penalties under complete male role inversion. Second, by decomposing unpaid labor into housework versus childcare, we test for task specificity, recognizing that interactive caregiving carries distinct psychological utility compared to routine domestic maintenance. Third, by evaluating these dynamics across overall life satisfaction and partner satisfaction in parallel, we demonstrate how dyadic role inversions impact general well-being versus immediate union friction, relationship quality, and dissolution risk (Johnson et al., 2024; Røsand et al., 2014). Fourth, by comparing the height of the COVID-19 pandemic (2021–2022) with the post-pandemic transition (2023–2024), we provide novel empirical evidence on whether these gendered well-being penalties represent rigid structural features or adapt across macro-level shocks.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 establishes the theoretical background and derives our research hypotheses. Section 3 details the data, variables, and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the econometric results together with heterogeneity and sensitivity checks, and Section 5 discusses the broader implications and concludes.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Relative Income Within a Partnership and Gender Identity

Rooted in Social Comparison Theory (Festinger 1954), individual evaluations of socioeconomic standing do not occur in isolation. Instead, individuals continuously evaluate their income and material positions against multiple reference groups, among which romantic partners might occur as the most available one. Unlike external comparisons with peers or colleagues, intra-household social comparisons operate under distinct psychological mechanics driven by high levels of empathy and a sense of shared fate (Pinkus et al. 2008). Consequently, individuals frequently respond positively even to upward comparisons

(i.e., where their partner out-earns them) because joint resource pooling aligns individual and household utility (Pinkus et al. 2008). However, the influence of relative income disparities manifests differently across global assessments (life satisfaction) versus relational evaluations (satisfaction with a partner), shaped by gendered differences in the importance of specific life domains. In particular, women assign greater weight to family satisfaction than job satisfaction when constructing global life satisfaction, whereas men weigh these domains equally (Steckermeier and Hess 2026). As a result, relative earnings shifts disproportionately alter man global satisfaction assessments. In particular, secondary-earner status significantly reduces life satisfaction among men, whereas women's life satisfaction remains largely resilient to secondary-earner positioning (Gash and Plagnol 2021). The sign of these internal comparative preferences was highlighted by Bertrand et al. (2015), who documented a sharp drop in the relative income distribution as a wife's income share exceeds 50%. This discontinuity was interpreted as evidence of strong individual preferences enforcing male primary breadwinning, though subsequent reanalyses question the universality of this threshold effect (Binder and Lam 2018). Ultimately, these evolving comparative dynamics illustrate how individual preferences and psychological reference points govern intra-household evaluations, providing a foundation for classical economic models of household specialization and relative resource exchange.

Classic economic approaches to the family establish market capacity and relative resource allocation as the primary drivers of household efficiency and partner well-being. Under Becker's (1985, 1991) human capital specialization model, household utility and productivity are maximized when partners divide labor according to comparative advantage, with one spouse specializing in paid employment and the other in home production. By minimizing time pressure, financial strain, and role conflict, a specialized division of labor is posited to foster better household functioning and higher relationship satisfaction (Blom et al. 2017). However, recent empirical work demonstrates that comparative advantage plays a surprisingly minimal role in explaining actual gendered divisions of domestic labor (Siminski and Yetsenga 2022). Moving beyond unitary utility, relative resource and bargaining perspectives frame intra-household dynamics as continuous negotiations governed by power differentials (Brines 1994; Rogers 2004). From this viewpoint, earning a higher relative income generates structural leverage, enabling the higher-earning partner to "buy out" burdensome domestic tasks and negotiate relationship terms more aligned with their personal preferences, thereby securing greater satisfaction (Brines 1994; Rogers 2004). Alternatively, companionate marriage and role collaboration frameworks argue that task-sharing, mutual caregiving, and blurred gender roles yield greater emotional intimacy, mutual understanding, and union quality than rigid division

(Burgess et al. 1963; Wilcox and Nock 2006). However, standard resource-based models often fall short because intra-household utility is heavily constrained by social norms that alter how relative income shares are subjectively valued.

Gender identity perspectives modify pure economic utility functions by conceptualizing gender not as a static individual attribute, but as an emergent feature of social interactions that individuals actively perform, or "do", to align with societal expectations (West and Zimmerman 1987). This mechanism is formalized in identity economics, which incorporates social categories directly into individual utility functions, demonstrating that deviations from prescribed gender roles impose direct psychological and identity costs (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Central to this framework is the male breadwinner norm, which prescribes primary earning as a cornerstone of masculine identity. When intra-household income dynamics invert and wives out-earn their husbands, both partners experience normative disruptions. While for men, losing primary-earner status can diminish self-worth and trigger identity loss, for women, out-earning a spouse can erode regard for their partner, culminating in mutual relationship dissatisfaction and heightened union dissolution risks (Bertrand et al. 2015; Blom and Hewitt 2019; Lippmann et al. 2020; Rao 2017; Sherman 2017). To neutralize this gender deviance, primary-earning women frequently overperform unpaid domestic work to symbolically reaffirm traditional gender roles (Bertrand et al. 2015; Lippmann et al. 2020; Schneider 2011). Behavioral evidence underscores these asymmetric preferences: while women generally exhibit a preference for relative income equality, men display a distinct, kinked preference for being the primary earner, generating substantial psychological and welfare costs under role inversion (Hermle et al. 2024; Kolpashnikova and Kan 2026).

The empirical manifestation of these normative constraints varies significantly across cultural and institutional contexts. In societies with strong traditional gender expectations, such as Germany, Hungary, or China, a higher female income share yields a pervasive "happiness penalty" for both men and women (Gihleb et al. 2014; Hajdu and Hajdu 2018; Hajdu and Sik 2022; Salland and Dewenter 2021; Wu, 2021). Conversely, in highly egalitarian contexts like Sweden, the male breadwinner premium largely disappears (Hederos Eriksson and Stenberg 2015), and generic relative-income dynamics may dominate domain-specific financial evaluations (Eirich and Robinson 2017). Nevertheless, where traditional breadwinner mentalities persist, structural deviations from male financial primacy generate systematic satisfaction penalties. In Poland's traditionally gendered context, the COVID-19 pandemic served as an exogenous stress test for household gender roles, followed by post-pandemic economic and labor market pressures. Capturing both periods offers novel empirical evidence

on whether gendered well-being penalties endure or adapt during times of crisis. Building on these theoretical frameworks, we formulate two core hypotheses:

- **H1 (Breadwinner Premium):** *Only men report higher satisfaction when they out-earn their partner.*
- **H2 (Costs of Violation):** *Women report lower satisfaction when out-earning their partners; men report lower satisfaction when out-earned.*

2.2. Interaction with Domestic Labor Division

When relative income and domestic labor interact, the economic expectation that financial bargaining power translates into reduced housework can be overridden by gendered expectations. According to the gender deviance neutralization hypothesis, a woman who out-earns her partner may compensate for violating traditional breadwinner norms by taking on a disproportionate share of domestic work, thereby symbolically restoring normative balance within the household (Bertrand et al. 2015; Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; Syrda 2022). Empirical support for this behavior remains mixed: while some studies show that higher female relative income or education leads to increased male domestic involvement (Fetterolf and Rudman 2014; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2006), others observe no such effect (Nitsche and Grunow 2016; Simister 2013). In Poland, for instance, Magda et al. (2024) find that a higher female income share is associated with a lower domestic workload for women, directly challenging deviance neutralization, though this leverage is heavily moderated by gender norms, remaining largely absent in more traditional couples.

When female breadwinning coexists with primary domestic responsibility, women shoulder a compound "second shift" that encompasses not only physical labor but also an intense cognitive load. This load is characterized by the continuous, invisible effort of organizing household logistics, which drives emotional fatigue and dyadic friction, especially when male partners fail to recognize this mental burden (Barigozzi 2025; Hochschild and Machung 2012). This mismatch between economic contribution and domestic burden creates strong perceptions of unfairness that systematically depress relationship satisfaction (Baxter and Hewitt 2013; Blom and Hewitt 2019; Koster et al. 2022). Building on this framework, we test whether the combination of higher relative earnings and heavy domestic labor creates a distinct satisfaction penalty:

- **H3 (Double Burden):** *There is a satisfaction penalty among out-earning women who do the majority of unpaid work.*

While out-earning women face satisfaction losses when attempting to neutralize deviance through excessive housework, an even more acute identity threat occurs when men experience a total inversion of traditional financial and domestic roles. In other words, this traditional role reversal occurs if a man is both out-earned by their female counterpart and does the majority of unpaid domestic work.

From the male perspective, while being out-earned can create acute status anxiety, a complete inversion of both economic and domestic roles eliminates any lingering buffer of traditional masculine identity. Across Europe, the rapid expansion of dual-earner households and women's increasing financial contributions have substantially eroded the traditional single-breadwinner model (Klesment and Van Bavel 2017; Kowalewska and Vitali 2021). Nevertheless, normative expectations surrounding male primary breadwinning and female domestic management often linger unevenly, remaining influential reference points for identity and partnership dynamics (Gash and Plagnol 2021; Lyonette and Crompton 2015). Deviating from these historical archetypes can challenge normative expectations, potentially diminishing men's self-worth, eroding mutual relationship satisfaction, and depressing overall subjective well-being, particularly among individuals operating within more traditional norm environments (Blom and Hewitt 2020; Hajdu and Hajdu 2018). Anticipated norm violations remain so potent that some women intentionally constrain their labor market potential to avoid out-earning their spouses (Bertrand et al. 2015; Doumbia and Gousse 2021). As Syrda (2019) demonstrates, male psychological distress often increases alongside economic reliance on a spouse, peaking under high financial dependence. When economic dependence is further compounded by assuming primary responsibility for domestic tasks, men experience a structural role inversion without a traditional domain to anchor their status. Examining how couples navigate these arrangements provides valuable insight into the ongoing evolution of gender norms across Europe. Therefore, this pronounced role reversal might trigger identity threat and status anxiety, leading to our fourth hypothesis:

- **H4 (Role Reversal):** *Men face the greatest satisfaction penalty when traditional norms are fully inverted (i.e., when they are both out-earned by their female partner and perform the majority of unpaid domestic work).*

2.3. Heterogeneity across Parental Status and Temporal Contexts

Finally, treating unpaid labor as a uniform burden can mask some nuances, as unpaid labor is not a homogenous entity for parents, usually consisting of housework and caregiving. Housework, comprising more routine, time-rigid, and low-autonomy tasks like cleaning and

laundry, offers rather minimal intrinsic fulfillment and acts as a primary source of distributive resentment when unfairly allocated. In contrast, childcare, particularly its interactive and developmental components, carries positive emotional utility and aligns with intensive parenting norms, making it one of the most gratifying daily activities for parents (Dotti Sani 2022; Nelson 2010; Poortman and Van der Lippe 2009). As a result, unequal divisions of childcare are widely perceived as fair by both mothers and fathers, far more so than unequal divisions of routine chores (Baxter 2000; Carriero 2011; Koster et al. 2022; Nordenmark and Nyman 2003). Although extreme caregiving imbalances can eventually generate physical and temporal strain that mimics the burden of housework (Koster et al. 2022), the relational rewards and positive life-satisfaction returns of interactive caregiving generally mitigate feelings of inequity (Dotti Sani 2022). Because childcare yields distinct psychological utility, we argue that its division is unlikely to exacerbate the status anxiety or perceived unfairness stemming from relative income inversions in the way routine domestic maintenance does. This leads to our fifth hypothesis:

- **H5 (Chore Specificity):** *Among parents, the satisfaction penalty is moderated by the division of housework, but not by the division of childcare.*

Beyond individual household structures, gendered well-being dynamics are deeply sensitive to macro-environmental conditions. In particular, evaluating the trajectory across both the height of the COVID-19 pandemic (2021–2022) and the subsequent post-pandemic transition (2023–2024) provides a compelling opportunity to analyze how major structural disruptions alter gendered relationship mechanics over time. How exogenous shocks affect the link between relative income, domestic labor, and satisfaction in the longer run remains an open theoretical question. During acute crisis periods, elevated existential uncertainty and sudden re-prioritizations of values may temporarily mute material income comparisons (Bimonte et al. 2022) or buffer domestic tension through collective resilience (Delhey et al. 2023; Vignoli et al. 2025). However, as emergency conditions subsided and routines normalized, initial domestic shifts proved largely transitory (Augustine and Prickett 2026; Lütolf and Oehrli 2026). As couples adapt to post-pandemic economic realities, it remains unclear whether traditional status anxieties and gender role penalties simply re-emerged or followed altered trajectories. Rather than positing a rigid directional hypothesis, comparing the pandemic and post-pandemic periods allows us to explore how relative income disparities and domestic labor moderation shape overall life satisfaction and partner satisfaction across two contrasting macro-contextual regimes.

While existing research has primarily focused on how partners' relative earnings influence overall life satisfaction, its impact on relationship-specific well-being remains far less understood. To address this limitation, we distinguish between overall life satisfaction and partner satisfaction, examining both outcomes in parallel. Our study asks two central questions: First, to what extent do the well-being effects of relative income disparities differ when evaluated against overall life satisfaction versus partner satisfaction? Second, how does the household division of unpaid labor moderate these dynamics across two distinct macro-contexts i.e., the COVID-19 pandemic and the post-pandemic period? To our knowledge, no prior study has simultaneously accounted for these dual well-being outcomes alongside domestic labor moderation and temporal macro-level shifts.

3. Data and Method

3.1. Data

We use longitudinal panel data collected annually from Polish respondents between 2021 and 2024 as part of the follow-up Familydemic project (Kurowska et al. 2023; <https://familydemic.wnpism.uw.edu.pl/>). This observation period captures a critical transition. While 2021 and early 2022 were still marked by ongoing local quarantines, temporary school closures, and widespread remote work, most public health restrictions were phased out starting in March 2022, leading to full formal normalization in the early 2023. Surveys were administered by Ariadna, a professional online research platform, which recruited adult participants from its pool of over 200,000 registered users. Participation in the study was voluntary, and remuneration was provided according to the panel's loyalty program. The analytical sample includes 1,559 partnered women and 1,166 partnered men who remained in different-sex relationships with the same partner across all four survey waves. The panel is unbalanced, retaining 812 women and 696 men by the final wave. Notably, we distinguish between individuals who do not reside with minor children under the age of 18 (hereafter referred to as having no parental responsibilities) and those living with a child under 18 (with parental responsibilities) for which we have information about childcare-related tasks. Table 1 outlines the overall sample characteristics pooled across all four waves while wave-by-wave breakdowns detailing sample composition and attrition across waves are reported in Appendix Table A1.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample by Gender and Childcare Responsibilities, Pooled Data

Variable	Women			Men		
	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities
Age (M±SD)	43.96±10.70	47.92±11.73	40.11±7.87	48.84±9.68	52.44±9.38	44.20±7.93
<i>Subjective Assessment of Material Situation N (%)</i>						
Living comfortably on present income	421 (8.68%)	209 (8.74%)	212 (8.62%)	340 (9.05%)	164 (7.76%)	176 (10.71%)
Coping on present income	3,381 (69.73%)	1,704 (71.27%)	1,677 (68.23%)	2,673 (71.15%)	1,520 (71.90%)	1,153 (70.18%)
Finding it difficult on present income	954 (19.67%)	443 (18.53%)	511 (20.79%)	672 (17.89%)	394 (18.64%)	278 (16.92%)
Finding it very difficult on present income	93 (1.92%)	35 (1.46%)	58 (2.36%)	72 (1.92%)	36 (1.70%)	36 (2.19%)
Respondent Currently Employed N (%)	3,430 (70.74%)	1,697 (70.97%)	1,733 (70.50%)	3,038 (80.86%)	1,556 (73.60%)	1,643 (90.20%)
Partner Currently Employed N (%)	3,991 (82.31%)	1,794 (75.03%)	2,197 (89.38%)	2,640 (70.27%)	1,381 (65.33%)	1,259 (76.63%)
Respondent Highly Educated N (%)	2,478 (51.10%)	1,097 (45.88%)	1,381 (56.18%)	1,753 (46.66%)	898 (42.48%)	855 (52.04%)
Partner Highly Educated N (%)	1,357 (31.70%)	685 (28.65%)	852 (34.66%)	1,820 (48.44%)	833 (39.40%)	987 (60.07%)
Childcare responsibilities	2,458 (50.69%)			1,643 (43.73%)		
Total Number of Observations	4,849	2,391	2,458	3,757	2,114	1,643

3.2. Key Variables

Our dependent variables capture two dimensions of SWB: (1) overall life satisfaction and (2) satisfaction with one's partner, measured using single-item questions asking: “*Please tell us how satisfied you currently are with life as a whole*” and “*with your relationship with your partner.*” Both items were answered on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (“completely dissatisfied”) to 10 (“extremely satisfied”). The key explanatory variable is relative income within the relationship, assessed via the question: “*Considering all sources of income, between you and your spouse/partner, who had the higher income in the last month?*” The original five response categories, (1) “I have a much higher income,” (2) “I have a higher income,” (3) “We have about the same income,” (4) “My spouse/partner has a higher income,” and (5) “My spouse/partner has a much higher income”, were recoded into three categories for analysis: respondent earns more (combining categories 1 and 2), equal income (category 3, serving as the reference group), and partner earns more (combining categories 4 and 5).

The Familydemic dataset includes questions covering seven housework chores (cooking and meal preparation, daily kitchen cleaning, general house cleaning, laundry, shopping, maintenance and repairs, and paying bills) and five childcare tasks (physical care, playing or reading, helping with schoolwork, transportation to activities, and general oversight).

For each task, respondents evaluated the division of labor using a 5-point scale ranging from "always me" to "always my partner," with "my partner and me about equally" as the midpoint. Two additional response options, "always or usually someone else" and "does not apply", were available, but were extremely rare in the analytical sample and, thus, excluded.

To evaluate the moderating role of unpaid labor, we examine routine housework and childcare duties separately. To operationalize these moderators, we construct continuous indices ranging from 0 to 1, representing the respondent's mean share of participation across distinct domestic tasks. Values of 1 indicate that tasks are performed exclusively by the respondent ("always me"), 0.75 indicate that respondent is usually responsible for that task ("usually me"), 0.5 reflects an equal division of labor ("equal"), 0.25 reflects that it is usually their partner ("usually my partner"), and 0 denotes tasks performed exclusively by the partner ("always my partner"). For the housework index we used all tasks available in the data except for paying bills as this task is rather occasional and automated, hence, not that time-consuming.

To account for housework task intensity, we derived task weights based on time-use estimates from the Polish Harmonized European Time Use Survey (HETUS; Garcia-Roman and Ophir 2024). Because published HETUS estimates report a combined daily average of 105 minutes for meal preparation and post-meal cleaning, we arbitrarily assigned 80 minutes to cooking and 25 minutes to kitchen cleaning. Time weights for the remaining chores were allocated as follows: general house cleaning (91 minutes), shopping and administration (50 minutes), maintenance and repairs (35 minutes), and laundry (19 minutes). Unfortunately, due to a lack of comparably detailed time-use estimates for specific childcare tasks in European data, childcare tasks were unweighted.

After calculating the weighted housework index and unweighted childcare index, we categorized them into three discrete levels. Index values between 0.4 and 0.6 were classified as "about the same," values greater than 0.6 indicated that the respondent performed the majority of domestic work, while values less than 0.4 indicated that the partner did more. Descriptive statistics for satisfaction, relative income, and unpaid labor division disaggregated by gender and childcare responsibilities are presented for the pooled sample in Table 2, with wave-by-wave breakdowns provided in Appendix Table A2. Correlations between life and partner satisfaction are rather moderate ranging from 0.56 to 0.64 across waves for both genders.

Table 2. Distribution of Satisfaction, Relative Income and Unpaid Labor Division by Gender and Childcare Responsibilities, Pooled Data

Variable	Women			Men		
	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities
Life Satisfaction (M±SD)	6.91±1.94	6.97±1.88	6.85±1.99	7.03±1.87	7.05±1.89	7.01±1.86
Partner Satisfaction (M±SD)	7.45±2.26	7.71±2.13	7.20±2.35	7.70±2.07	7.85±2.06	7.50±2.08
<i>Relative Income in a Partnership N (%)</i>						
We earn about the same	1,119 (23.08%)	546 (22.84%)	573 (23.31%)	906 (24.11%)	535 (25.31%)	371 (22.58%)
I earn more	927 (19.12%)	540 (22.58%)	387 (15.74%)	2,179 (58.00%)	1,141 (53.97%)	1,038 (63.18%)
My partner earns more	2,803 (57.81%)	1,305 (54.58%)	1,498 (60.94%)	672 (17.89%)	438 (20.72%)	234 (14.24%)
<i>Share of Housework N (%)</i>						
About the same	1,432 (29.53%)	761 (31.66%)	677 (27.52%)	1,832 (48.76%)	999 (47.08%)	835 (50.79%)
Partner does more	130 (2.68%)	70 (2.91%)	60 (2.44%)	827 (22.01%)	483 (22.76%)	347 (21.11%)
I do more	3,289 (67.79%)	1,573 (65.43%)	1,723 (70.04%)	1,098 (29.23%)	640 (30.16%)	462 (28.10%)
<i>Share of Childcare N (%)</i>						
About the same			905 (34.23%)			1,114 (63.58%)
Partner does more			102 (3.86%)			335 (19.12%)
I do more			1,637 (61.91%)			303 (17.29%)

In our analyses, we control for respondents' subjective material situation (four levels: living comfortably on present income, coping on present income, finding it difficult, and finding it very difficult on present income), age and age squared, employment status of both partners (binary indicators for current employment or self-employment), educational attainment of both partners (binary indicators for tertiary education), and a dummy indicating the presence of a child under 18 in the household. Importantly, we did not restrict our sample exclusively to currently employed individuals, as non-employed partners in Poland may still receive non-wage income, such as parental leave benefits, passive income, or government allowances. Indeed, within our sample, nearly 68% of non-employed men and 24% of non-employed women reported earning at least as much income as their partners.

3.3 Empirical strategy

Leveraging a four-wave panel structure with repeated observations of the same individuals offers a key analytical advantage. It allows us to account for individual time-invariant differences that typically confounds cross-sectional estimates of subjective well-being. A random-effects specification was chosen over a fixed-effects approach because our primary explanatory variables, relative income status and division of housework, exhibit

limited within-individual variation across the four waves. Thus, applying fixed-effects estimation would rule out most of the information in these key variables. Also, the remaining within-person variation would largely be measurement error or random noise making rendering coefficients statistically insignificant even where a real relationship exists. The random-effects framework accommodates the hierarchical nesting of repeated observations within individuals, allowing us to overcome this limitation by retaining both between-couple differences and within-person shifts without sacrificing statistical power.

The analysis proceeded in several stages. First, to verify hypotheses 1 and 2, baseline random-effects panel regression models were estimated separately by gender, using overall life satisfaction and partner satisfaction as dependent variables. These models examined the association between relative income contribution and well-being outcomes while controlling for a set of individual and dyadic covariates. Next, to verify hypotheses 3 and 4, interaction models were estimated to assess whether the relationship between relative income contribution and both life and partner satisfaction was moderated by the division of housework. Average marginal effects of relative income were subsequently calculated across categories of domestic labor division.

The analyses were then repeated separately for individuals with and without minor children in the household to verify hypothesis 5. For each group, baseline and housework moderation models were re-estimated using the same set of covariates. For those with childcare responsibilities, an additional set of interaction models was estimated to examine whether the association between relative income contribution and satisfaction was moderated by the division of childcare. As in the housework models, average marginal effects were computed across each category of the childcare division.

Next, leveraging our dataset's coverage of both the pandemic (2021–2022) and post-pandemic (2023–2024) periods, we conducted heterogeneity checks by re-estimating the baseline models separately across both time frames. This allowed us to assess whether our primary effects were driven by the unique circumstances of the pandemic. Finally, to assess the stability of our findings, we conducted two main sensitivity analyses. First, all analyses were replicated using a restricted sample of couples in which both partners were currently employed, checking if the findings were not driven by differences in labor force participation. Second, the moderation analyses were repeated using alternative operationalizations of the unpaid work division. Alongside our primary threshold defining equal division as a 0.40–0.60 share, we evaluated both a broader (0.35–0.65) and a narrower (0.45–0.55)


definition of domestic equality. These alternative categorizations were applied consistently to both housework and childcare measures.

4. Results

4.1. Estimating the Effects of Relative Income on Satisfaction Outcomes

We start with the models without moderation. First, relative income within a partnership matters primarily for men's overall life satisfaction (see Fig. 1 for marginal effects and Table 3 for the full model), while for women, we only see effects on partner satisfaction. Specifically, men who out-earn their female partners report higher life satisfaction, whereas those whose partners earn more experience lower levels. For women, however, we observe significant negative effects of out-earning their male counterparts on satisfaction with a partner. Thus, for men, relative income does not appear to relate to satisfaction with a partner, but only to their global assessment of happiness while for women the effect is localized in the satisfaction with a partnership.

Figure 1. Marginal Effects of Relative Income Position in a Partnership on Life and Partner Satisfaction



Note: Models control for subjective assessment of material situation, age, age squared, employment status of both partners, educational attainment of both partners, and childcare responsibilities status. The reference category for relative income is "My partner and I earn about the same".

As for the control variables, the worse subjective assessment of material situation the lower life and partner satisfaction with the effects being comparable across genders. Being

currently employed is associated only to men's life satisfaction while for women we observe positive associations between their partners employment and their satisfactions (both with life and with partnership). Having higher education and being a parent with childcare responsibilities matters only for the partner satisfaction of women. In particular, highly educated women and those with childcare responsibilities are less satisfied with their partners but when they have a highly educated partner then they are more satisfied with their partners. Age effects are rather non-significant among subgroups with the exception of the positive, albeit neglectable in size, effects of squared age for women's life satisfaction and men's partner satisfaction.

Table 3. Results of the Models Without Moderation


Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partner Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.030 (0.073)	0.154* (0.061)	-0.227** (0.084)	0.054 (0.068)
My partner earns more	-0.055 (0.058)	-0.196* (0.077)	-0.029 (0.067)	-0.056 (0.087)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.561*** (0.083)	-0.446*** (0.084)	-0.278** (0.095)	-0.191* (0.095)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.202*** (0.098)	-1.271*** (0.103)	-0.677*** (0.112)	-0.537*** (0.117)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-1.857*** (0.180)	-1.999*** (0.195)	-1.332*** (0.206)	-1.319*** (0.220)
Respondent's age	-0.065 (0.034)	-0.053 (0.045)	-0.074 (0.042)	-0.099 (0.052)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001* (0.001)
Respondent currently employed	0.059 (0.061)	0.229** (0.075)	-0.051 (0.071)	-0.095 (0.085)
Partner currently employed	0.174* (0.068)	0.039 (0.063)	0.195* (0.079)	0.074 (0.071)
Respondent highly educated	0.081 (0.073)	0.042 (0.079)	-0.180* (0.086)	-0.053 (0.091)
Partner highly educated	0.049 (0.071)	0.125 (0.075)	0.180* (0.083)	0.073 (0.085)
Childcare responsibilities	0.123 (0.073)	-0.071 (0.075)	-0.276** (0.087)	-0.149 (0.086)
Constant	8.209*** (0.693)	8.025*** (0.988)	9.232*** (0.850)	9.604*** (1.153)
Observations	5,367	4,088	5,367	4,088
Number of individuals	1,559	1,166	1,559	1,166

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses

4.2. Testing the Moderating Role of Housework Division

Next, the marginal effects of the housework moderation are presented in Figure 2, while the exact marginal effects with 5% statistical significance are presented in Table 4, and the full model results with interactions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. For women, it seems that the partner satisfaction penalty for out-earning a male counterpart appears only for those women who do the majority of housework. For men, we observe that the life satisfaction premium of out-earning a female partner is driven by those keeping a traditional division of unpaid labor i.e., where their partner does more. Also, life satisfaction penalty occurs when female counterparts earn more and the men share housework equally or do the majority of it, which is an observation of the opposite of traditional breadwinner norms. Contrary to the previous findings, we find a significant association between relative income and men's partner satisfaction. In particular, we find that men have lower partner satisfaction if they are out-earned and share housework equally.

Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Relative Income Position in a Partnership on Life and Partner Satisfaction Moderated by Housework Division



Note: Models control for subjective assessment of material situation, age, age squared, employment status of both partners, educational attainment of both partners, and childcare responsibilities status. The reference category for relative income is "My partner and I earn about the same".

Table 4. Marginal Effects for Relative Income and Housework Interaction

Marginal Effects of Relative income (Ref. Cat. <i>We earn about the same</i>) x Housework Division Interaction	Life Satisfaction		Partner Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
I earn more x We do about the same	0.142 (0.124)	0.104 (0.081)	-0.093 (0.138)	0.069 (0.092)

Marginal Effects of Relative income (Ref. Cat. <i>We earn about the same</i>) x Housework Division Interaction	Life Satisfaction		Partner Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
I earn more x Partner does more	0.349 (0.345)	0.373** (0.122)	0.348 (0.384)	0.016 (0.138)
I earn more x I do more	-0.076 (0.092)	0.087 (0.103)	-0.320** (0.103)	0.065 (0.117)
My partner earns more x We do about the same	-0.043 (0.097)	-0.226* (0.108)	0.067 (0.109)	-0.324** (0.122)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.017 (0.320)	0.018 (0.154)	0.461 (0.356)	0.198 (0.174)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.045 (0.074)	-0.278* (0.126)	-0.044 (0.083)	0.045 (0.142)


Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses

4.3. Estimating the Effects by Childcare Responsibilities

Finally, we divide our sample between those with and without childcare responsibilities in the household. The results for individuals without childcare responsibilities are presented in Figure 3, while results for parents with children in the household are presented in Figure 4, with marginal effects for both groups in Table 5 and detailed model results in the Appendix (Tables A2, A3 and A4). Starting with those without children in the household, we see that relative income is not associated with any satisfaction outcomes for women but only for men. In particular, we see that those men in traditional settings i.e., earning more than a partner and with a partner doing more housework, have higher satisfaction with life and with a partner. Interestingly, for this group, we also observe a partner satisfaction premium for men who are out-earned but have a partner who still does the majority of the housework, which represents a situation in which a woman faces a double burden.


However, when looking at parents with children in the household, we see significant effects for both genders. First, regarding the moderating role of the division of housework, we only see the associations with partner satisfaction. In particular, women who out-earn their partners and still do the majority of the housework (i.e., they experience double burden) have lower satisfaction with a partner while for men this lower partner satisfaction is associated to being out-earned and sharing housework equally. As for the division of childcare, we also see that for women earning more and doing more of childcare is associated with lower partner satisfaction. For men, the picture is more complex as, on the one hand, they have lower life satisfaction if there is a complete role reversal in childcare (i.e., woman earns more and he does more of childcare). On the other hand, however, when she earns more and still does more of childcare the partner satisfaction of a man is lower. This would mean that men are less satisfied if their female partner experience a double burden in childcare.

Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Relative Income Position in a Partnership on Life and Partner Satisfaction of Individuals Without Childcare Responsibilities Moderated by Housework



Note: Models control for subjective assessment of material situation, age, age squared, employment status of both partners, educational attainment of both partners, and childcare responsibilities status. The reference category for relative income is “My partner and I earn about the same”.

Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Relative Income Position in a Partnership on Life and Partner Satisfaction of Parents with Children in the Household Moderated by Housework and Childcare



Note: Models control for subjective assessment of material situation, age, age squared, employment status of both partners, educational attainment of both partners, and childcare responsibilities status. The reference category for relative income is “My partner and I earn about the same”.

4.4. Heterogeneity Analysis

The results of the heterogeneity analysis (Tables A7–A9 in the Appendix) show differences in the effects between the pandemic (2021–2022) and the post-pandemic period (2023–2024). First, models without moderation suggest that the effects of relative income are only significant for the post-pandemic period. However, when we look at the models including the moderating effects of housework division, some effects appear for both time frames. In particular, we again observe a life satisfaction bonus for men who earn more and whose partners do the majority of housework, as well as a life satisfaction penalty for men who are out-earned and share housework equally. The remaining effects are significant only for the post-pandemic period. Specifically, for women, we observe a negative effect of out-earning and doing more housework on partner satisfaction, but also a life satisfaction premium for out-earning women who share housework equally with their partner. The same situation from the perspective of men is, however, associated with significantly lower levels of life satisfaction. Nevertheless, when their female partner out-earns them but still does more housework, they report higher satisfaction with their partner. Overall, these results suggest that during the pandemic, income comparisons might not have been as important for satisfaction as in “normal” times.

4.5. Sensitivity Analyses

Sensitivity analyses (Tables A10–A16) revealed high consistency for our core domestic labor findings, while highlighting key boundary conditions regarding male role reversal. Across all specifications, including restricted employment subsamples and alternative equality thresholds, the negative partner satisfaction effect of the double burden on primary-earning women remained statistically significant and stable. Similarly, the life satisfaction premium for men who out-earn their partners while doing less of housework was robust across all checks.

When restricting the analytical sample exclusively to dual-employed couples, the baseline negative association between being out-earned and male life satisfaction became statistically non-significant, and the male role-reversal moderation attenuated. This suggests that employment status might serve as an important psychological buffer, i.e., the satisfaction penalty for out-earned men performing primary housework is most pronounced when compounded by labor market inactivity or non-standard employment, whereas regular employment partially offsets these unfavorable comparison effects. Finally, varying the threshold for domestic equality showed that male role-reversal penalties occur whether a broader or narrower definition of equity is applied, emerging both when out-earned men share housework equally and when they perform the majority of it, which is unsurprising given the resulting shifts in sample size.

Table 5. Marginal Effects for Relative Income and Housework Interaction

Marginal Effects of Relative Income (Ref. Cat. <i>We earn about the same</i>)	Life Satisfaction				Partner Satisfaction			
	Women		Men		Women		Men	
	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities
<i>Housework Division Interaction</i>								
I earn more x We do about the same	0.119 (0.162)	0.203 (0.192)	0.120 (0.107)	0.102 (0.124)	-0.047 (0.174)	-0.103 (0.219)	0.160 (0.118)	-0.060 (0.144)
I earn more x Partner does more	0.143 (0.475)	0.745 (0.538)	0.488** (0.161)	0.265 (0.187)	0.236 (0.509)	0.743 (0.614)	0.352* (0.178)	-0.343 (0.217)
I earn more x I do more	0.037 (0.123)	-0.210 (0.140)	-0.031 (0.139)	0.192 (0.154)	-0.092 (0.133)	-0.588*** (0.160)	0.062 (0.154)	0.128 (0.179)
My partner earns more x We do about the same	-0.078 (0.130)	0.040 (0.149)	-0.185 (0.137)	-0.332 (0.176)	0.145 (0.140)	0.047 (0.171)	-0.069 (0.151)	-0.763*** (0.204)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.179 (0.462)	0.282 (0.467)	0.035 (0.193)	0.156 (0.258)	0.226 (0.496)	0.948 (0.530)	0.648** (0.212)	-0.288 (0.300)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.103 (0.105)	0.001 (0.105)	-0.233 (0.160)	-0.343 (0.206)	0.056 (0.113)	-0.051 (0.120)	0.113 (0.177)	-0.078 (0.239)
<i>Childcare Division Interaction</i>								
I earn more x We do about the same		-0.061 (0.175)		0.246* (0.106)		-0.328 (0.205)		-0.003 (0.123)
I earn more x Partner does more		0.374 (0.439)		0.110 (0.214)		-0.194 (0.512)		-0.322 (0.249)
I earn more x I do more		-0.044 (0.139)		-0.254 (0.194)		-0.422** (0.163)		-0.119 (0.225)
My partner earns more x We do about the same		0.009 (0.131)		-0.115 (0.145)		0.001 (0.153)		-0.324 (0.168)
My partner earns more x Partner does more		0.346 (0.355)		-0.420 (0.278)		-0.179 (0.414)		-0.735* (0.322)
My partner earns more x I do more		-0.020 (0.106)		-0.715** (0.268)		-0.005 (0.124)		-0.404 (0.311)

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, standard errors in parentheses

5. Discussion and Conclusion

Our empirical findings demonstrate that intra-household relative income comparisons do not affect SWB in an economic vacuum, but these associations are conditioned by actual domestic behaviors. In line with H1, men report significantly higher life satisfaction when out-earning their female partners, corroborating the persistent male breadwinner premium documented across contexts with enduring traditional gender norms (Gihleb et al., 2014; Hajdu and Hajdu, 2018; Hajdu and Sik, 2022; Salland and Dewenter, 2021; Wu, 2021). Furthermore, our results confirm H2 by revealing clear costs of norm violation for both men and women. Specifically, men suffer lower overall life satisfaction when out-earned by their spouses, whereas women report lower partner, but not life, satisfaction when assuming primary breadwinner status. In contrast to findings by Goraus-Tańska et al. (2026) suggesting that women are unresponsive to relative income positions, we show that women do respond to relative income, though this evaluation is localized to relational satisfaction rather than global well-being. Crucially, the division of unpaid domestic labor serves as an important moderator that governs these satisfaction outcomes.

Interpreted through the combined lenses of Identity Economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) and Gender Deviance Neutralization (Bittman et al., 2003), our results demonstrate that domestic labor allocation serves as a tool to manage traditional identity violations. Supporting H3, the decline in partner satisfaction among out-earning women is visible specifically by those who face a double burden i.e., perform the majority of routine housework alongside primary breadwinning. Conversely, supporting H4, men experience a significant life satisfaction penalty under complete role reversal, where they are both out-earned and perform the majority of domestic work. Notably, this vulnerability extends to partial role reversals, as out-earned men who share chores equally also experience significantly lower life and partner satisfaction. By contrast, men report a distinct life satisfaction premium when out-earning their partner while maintaining a traditional division of labor. Therefore, rather than operating under pure efficiency where higher earnings allow individuals to seamlessly "buy out" of domestic work, intra-household allocations are heavily constrained by gender norms, causing standard resource-based trade-offs to break down under norm-violating conditions.

Crucially, our findings reveal a fundamental domain heterogeneity in how relative income impacts SWB across genders. While it seems to be more of a global issue of life satisfaction for men, it is rather a domain-specific issue of relationship quality for women. When a man is out-earned, it directly threatens his societal standing and normative masculinity framework (Couglin and Wade, 2012; Syrda, 2019), resulting in a systemic spillover into overall life

satisfaction. For women, however, out-earning a partner rarely damages their internal sense of womanhood. Hence, their global life satisfaction remains unchanged but, instead, the psychological toll is localized entirely within the relational domain, where the daily structural mechanics and perceived unfairness of domestic inequality generate friction and resentment. Importantly, our results show that, in the Polish context, women do not possess an inherent preference for earning less than their partners. Instead, their decreased partner satisfaction stems directly from the strain of the double burden. Because domain-specific relationship dissatisfaction is a well-established driver of union dissolution risk and family instability (Johnson et al., 2024; Røsand et al., 2014), distinguishing global life satisfaction from partner satisfaction is essential for accurately capturing the modern mechanisms of marital strain.

Contrary to our chore specificity hypothesis (H_5), our empirical findings reveal that childcare division plays an active moderating role among individuals with childcare responsibilities. Although theoretical literature frequently distinguishes childcare as a high-utility, relational activity offering intrinsic emotional rewards (Dotti Sani, 2022; Nelson, 2010; Poortman & Van der Lippe, 2009), our results demonstrate that the heavy temporal and cognitive demands of active parenting make childcare subject to equity evaluations and gender-norm expectations. For out-earning mothers, bearing the majority of either housework or childcare consistently generates a double-burden penalty that depresses partner satisfaction. For out-earned fathers, however, the moderating role of childcare is uniquely complex. While out-earned men experience lower partner satisfaction when sharing housework equally, a complete role reversal in childcare, where an out-earned father assumes primary caregiving duties, directly depresses his overall life satisfaction, signaling an acute identity penalty. Paradoxically, out-earned men also report significantly lower partner satisfaction when their higher-earning wife carries the majority of childcare responsibilities. This suggests that maternal childcare overload induces broader relational friction, where the stress and fatigue of a partner's double burden spill over to erode the man's evaluation of the relationship itself.

Our temporal findings reveal that unmoderated relative income effects were muted during the pandemic (2021–2022) but re-emerged strongly in the post-pandemic period (2023–2024). This crisis-era muting reflects value reprioritization and heightened domestic co-presence that temporarily overshadowed material status comparisons (Alon et al., 2020; Bimonte et al., 2022; Delhey et al., 2023; Vignoli et al., 2025). Nevertheless, incorporating domestic labor moderation demonstrates that underlying gender role expectations persisted across both timeframes: male primary breadwinning paired with traditional domestic support consistently

yielded a life satisfaction bonus, whereas out-earned men experienced penalties when sharing housework equally. The post-pandemic return to routine realities re-crystallized these status sensitivities as transitory crisis adaptations dissolved (Andrew et al., 2022; Augustine and Prickett, 2026; Lütolf and Oehrli, 2026). In this post-crisis regime, primary-earning women enjoyed a life satisfaction premium under equal domestic division but suffered relational penalties under a double burden, whereas out-earned men maintained partner satisfaction only if their higher-earning wives continued performing the majority of domestic work. Overall, while acute crisis conditions temporarily buffered couples from material comparisons, post-pandemic normalization reactivated gendered status and domestic labor dynamics in shaping well-being.

Our findings carry critical policy and demographic implications when contextualized within Poland's distinct institutional landscape. In Poland, rising female tertiary educational attainment and labor force participation directly collide with rather sticky cultural breadwinner norms and traditionally familialist social policy frameworks (Eurostat, 2026; GUS, 2023; EIGE, 2023). This structural friction is emblematic of broader Central and Eastern European economies undergoing swift economic modernization alongside slower shifts in cultural gender role attitudes. Because reduced partner satisfaction is a well-established precursor to union dissolution and marital breakdown (Bertrand et al., 2015; Blom and Hewitt, 2019), mitigating the double burden borne by primary-earning women represents a vital demographic priority. To address this structural imbalance, policy interventions must move beyond passive family benefits toward active structural incentives, such as fully expanding non-transferable paternal leave quotas under the EU Work-Life Balance Directive. Such policies can institutionalize male caregiving, foster a more equitable redistribution of routine domestic labor, and buffer dual-earner couples against relational friction.

This study has several limitations that point to important avenues for future research. First, our measures rely on self-reported, subjective assessments of relative income and domestic task divisions, which may introduce perceptual bias and prevent direct verification of inter-partner agreement regarding actual labor allocation. Second, our analytical sample was restricted exclusively to different-sex couples, limiting the generalizability of our findings to same-sex or non-binary partnerships. Future research should build on our framework by utilizing exact time-use diary data rather than composite task indices to examine fine-grained domestic mechanisms. Additionally, scholars could enhance causal inference by leveraging exogenous income shocks or labor market disruptions to track how intra-household allocations dynamically adjust to sudden relative income shifts across major life transitions.

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Appendixes

Table A1. Distribution of Sample Characteristics across Panel Waves by Gender and Childcare Responsibilities

Variable	Women			Men		
	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities
Age (M±SD)	43.63±10.75	46.73±12.22	40.56±7.95	48.36±9.77	51.34±10.12	44.80±8.00
	43.83±10.65	47.79±11.78	40.04±7.75	48.72±9.59	52.52±9.08	43.97±7.97
	43.65±10.63	48.29±11.45	39.55±7.83	48.49±9.70	52.67±9.03	43.42±7.91
	45.26±10.73	49.65±10.99	40.32±7.92	50.23±9.52	53.59±8.95	44.73±7.69
<i>Subjective Assessment of Material Situation N (%)</i>						
Living comfortably on present income	131 (8.85%)	60 (8.15%)	71 (9.54%)	116 (10.52%)	59 (9.82%)	57 (11.35%)
	105 (8.15%)	56 (8.89%)	49 (7.44%)	69 (7.06%)	27 (4.97%)	42 (9.68%)
	99 (7.81%)	44 (7.39%)	55 (8.17%)	92 (9.38%)	41 (7.62%)	51 (11.51%)
	86 (10.59%)	49 (11.40%)	37 (9.69%)	63 (9.05%)	37 (8.56%)	26 (9.85%)
Coping on present income	1,075 (72.64%)	535 (72.69%)	540 (72.58%)	795 (72.08%)	431 (71.71%)	364 (72.51%)
	853 (66.18%)	429 (68.10%)	424 (64.34%)	678 (69.40%)	382 (70.35%)	296 (68.20%)
	858 (67.67%)	417 (70.08%)	441 (65.53%)	682 (69.52%)	386 (71.75%)	296 (66.82%)
	595 (73.28%)	323 (75.12%)	272 (71.20%)	518 (74.43%)	321 (74.31%)	197 (74.62%)
Finding it difficult on present income	254 (17.16%)	134 (18.21%)	120 (16.13%)	175 (15.87%)	103 (17.14%)	72 (14.34%)
	298 (23.12%)	132 (20.95%)	166 (25.19%)	202 (20.68%)	120 (22.10%)	82 (18.89%)
	285 (22.48%)	123 (20.67%)	462 (24.07%)	184 (18.76%)	101 (18.77%)	83 (18.74%)
	117 (14.41%)	54 (12.56%)	63 (16.49%)	111 (15.95%)	70 (16.20%)	41 (15.53%)
Finding it very difficult on present income	20 (1.35%)	7 (0.95%)	13 (1.75%)	17 (1.54%)	8 (1.33%)	9 (1.79%)
	33 (2.56%)	13 (2.06%)	20 (3.03%)	28 (2.87%)	14 (2.58%)	14 (3.23%)
	26 (2.05%)	11 (1.85%)	15 (2.23%)	23 (2.34%)	10 (1.86%)	13 (2.93%)
	14 (1.72%)	4 (0.93%)	10 (2.62%)	4 (0.57%)	4 (0.93%)	248 (93.94%)
Respondent Currently Employed N (%)	984 (66.49%)	512 (69.57%)	472 (63.44%)	858 (77.79%)	443 (73.71%)	415 (82.67%)
	926 (71.84%)	458 (72.70%)	468 (71.02%)	810 (82.91%)	401 (73.85%)	409 (94.24%)
	925 (72.95%)	425 (71.43%)	500 (74.29%)	806 (82.16%)	396 (73.61%)	410 (92.55%)
	595 (73.28%)	302 (70.23%)	293 (76.70%)	564 (81.03%)	316 (73.15%)	210 (79.55%)
Partner Currently Employed N (%)	1,237 (83.58%)	574 (77.99%)	663 (89.11%)	782 (70.90%)	402 (66.89%)	380 (75.70%)
	1,059 (82.16%)	474 (75.24%)	585 (88.77%)	683 (69.91%)		338 (77.88%)

Variable	Women			Men		
	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities
	1,045 (82.41%)	446 (74.96%)	599 (89.00%)	685 (69.83%)	345 (63.54%)	331 (74.72%)
	650 (80.05%)	300 (69.77%)	350 (91.62%)	490 (70.40%)	354 (65.80%)	210 (79.55%)
					280 (64.81%)	
	635 (42.91%)	287 (38.99%)	348 (46.77%)	433 (39.26%)	219 (36.44%)	214 (42.63%)
Respondent Highly Educated N (%)	705 (54.69%)	313 (49.68%)	392 (59.48%)	484 (49.54%)	237 (43.65%)	247 (56.91%)
	688 (54.26%)	282 (47.39%)	406 (60.33%)	482 (49.13%)	241 (44.80%)	241 (54.40%)
	450 (55.42%)	215 (50.00%)	235 (61.52%)	354 (50.86%)	201 (46.53%)	153 (57.95%)
	355 (23.99%)	164 (22.28%)	191 (25.67%)	449 (40.71%)	193 (32.11%)	256 (51.00%)
Partner Highly Educated N (%)	444 (34.45%)	201 (31.90%)	243 (36.87%)	521 (53.33%)	236 (43.46%)	285 (65.67%)
	439 (34.62%)	180 (30.25%)	259 (38.48%)	499 (50.87%)	222 (41.26%)	277 (62.53%)
	299 (36.82%)	140 (32.56%)	159 (41.62%)	351 (50.43%)	182 (42.13%)	169 (64.02%)
	744 (50.27%)			502 (45.51%)		
Having Children	659 (51.12%)			434 (44.42%)		
	673 (53.08%)			443 (45.16%)		
	382 (47.04%)			264 (37.93%)		
	1,480	736	744	1,103	601	502
Total Number of Observations	1,289	630	659	977	543	434
	1,268	595	673	981	538	443
	812	430	382	696	432	264

Note. For each variable, values are listed top-to-bottom across four rows corresponding to Waves 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Continuous variables are reported as Mean $\pm$ SD; categorical variables are reported as N (%).

Table A2. Distribution of Satisfaction, Relative Income, and Unpaid Labor Division across Panel Waves by Gender and Childcare Responsibilities

Variable	Women			Men		
	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities
Life Satisfaction (M±SD)	6.90±1.97	6.90±1.88	6.90±2.05	6.97±1.92	7.00±1.92	6.95±1.92
	6.84±1.94	6.91±1.90	6.77±1.99	6.96±1.91	6.95±1.97	6.97±1.85
	6.90±1.94	6.98±1.89	6.83±1.99	7.01±1.87	7.05±1.86	6.96±1.89
	7.05±1.88	7.14±1.84	6.95±1.91	7.25±1.74	7.23±1.77	7.27±1.68
Relationship Satisfaction (M±SD)	7.53±2.26	7.71±2.16	7.35±2.35	7.75±2.04	7.93±2.00	7.53±2.07
	7.47±2.22	7.77±2.12	7.18±2.27	7.67±2.06	7.74±2.01	7.44±2.10
	7.36±2.31	7.66±2.09	7.10±2.47	7.67±2.09	7.78±2.14	7.53±2.03
	7.43±2.23	7.68±2.15	7.15±2.29	7.71±2.11	7.84±2.08	7.50±2.15
<i>Relative Income in a Partnership N (%)</i>						
We earn about the same	336 (22.70%)	166 (22.55%)	170 (22.85%)	271 (24.57%)	156 (25.96%)	115 (22.91%)
	282 (21.88%)	140 (22.22%)	142 (21.55%)	237 (24.26%)	141 (25.97%)	96 (22.12%)
	309 (24.37%)	139 (23.36%)	170 (25.26%)	230 (23.45%)	130 (24.16%)	100 (22.57%)
	192 (23.65%)	101 (23.49%)	91 (23.82%)	168 (24.14%)	108 (25.00%)	60 (22.73%)
I earn more	287 (19.39%)	168 (22.83%)	119 (15.99%)	633 (57.39%)	318 (52.91%)	315 (62.75%)
	239 (18.54%)	142 (22.54%)	97 (14.72%)	575 (58.85%)	295 (54.33%)	280 (64.52%)
	230 (18.14%)	127 (21.34%)	103 (15.30%)	569 (58.00%)	287 (52.35%)	282 (63.66%)
	171 (21.06%)	103 (23.95%)	68 (17.80%)	402 (57.76%)	241 (55.79%)	161 (60.98%)
My partner earns more	857 (57.91%)	402 (54.62%)	455 (61.16%)	199 (18.04%)	127 (21.13%)	72 (14.34%)
	768 (59.58%)	348 (55.24%)	420 (63.73%)	165 (16.89%)	107 (19.71%)	58 (13.36%)
	729 (57.49%)	329 (55.29%)	400 (59.44%)	182 (18.55%)	121 (22.49%)	61 (13.77%)
	449 (55.30%)	226 (52.56%)	223 (58.38%)	126 (18.10%)	83 (19.21%)	43 (16.29%)
<i>Share of Housework N (%)</i>						
About the same	308 (20.81%)	176 (23.91%)	132 (17.74%)	366 (33.18%)	191 (31.78%)	175 (34.86%)
	417 (32.35%)	220 (34.92%)	197 (29.89%)	538 (55.07%)	292 (53.78%)	246 (56.68%)
	439 (34.62%)	214 (35.97%)	225 (33.43%)	544 (55.45%)	285 (52.97%)	259 (58.47%)
	268 (33.00%)	145 (33.72%)	123 (32.20%)	384 (55.17%)	229 (53.01%)	155 (58.71%)

Variable	Women			Men		
	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities	Total	No Childcare Responsibilities	With Childcare Responsibilities
Partner does more	23 (1.55%)	16 (2.17%)	7 (0.94%)	26 (2.36%)	19 (3.16%)	7 (1.39%)
	50 (3.88%)	26 (4.13%)	24 (3.64%)	303 (31.01%)	169 (31.12%)	134 (30.88%)
	36 (2.84%)	16 (2.69%)	20 (2.97%)	300 (30.58%)	171 (31.78%)	129 (29.12%)
	21 (2.59%)	12 (2.79%)	9 (2.36%)	198 (28.45%)	122 (28.24%)	76 (28.79%)
I do more	1,149 (77.64%)	544 (73.91%)	605 (81.32%)	711 (64.46%)	391 (65.06%)	320 (63.75%)
	822 (63.77%)	384 (60.95%)	438 (66.46%)	136 (13.92%)	82 (15.10%)	54 (12.44%)
	793 (62.54%)	365 (61.34%)	428 (63.60%)	137 (13.97%)	82 (15.24%)	55 (12.42%)
	523 (64.41%)	273 (63.49%)	250 (65.45%)	114 (16.38%)	81 (18.75%)	33 (12.50%)
<i>Share of Childcare N (%)</i>						
About the same			242 (32.53%)			279 (55.58%)
			216 (32.78%)			289 (66.59%)
			231 (34.32%)			294 (66.37%)
			150 (39.27%)			182 (68.94%)
Partner does more			66 (8.87%)			68 (13.55%)
			15 (2.28%)			94 (21.66%)
			11 (1.63%)			93 (20.99%)
			7 (1.83%)			54 (20.45%)
I do more			436 (58.60%)			155 (30.88%)
			428 (64.95%)			51 (11.75%)
			431 (64.04%)			56 (12.64%)
			225 (58.90%)			28 (10.61%)

Note. For each variable, values are listed top-to-bottom across four rows corresponding to Waves 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Continuous variables are reported as Mean $\pm$ SD; categorical variables are reported as N (%).

Table A3. Results of the Models With Moderation

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partnership Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.142 (0.124)	0.104 (0.081)	-0.093 (0.138)	0.069 (0.092)
My partner earns more	-0.043 (0.097)	-0.226* (0.108)	0.067 (0.109)	-0.324** (0.122)
<i>Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
Partner does more	0.096 (0.259)	-0.246* (0.120)	-0.256 (0.288)	-0.053 (0.136)
I do more	-0.013 (0.259)	-0.081 (0.103)	-0.196 (0.108)	-0.067 (0.116)
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same) x Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
I earn more x Partner does more	0.207 (0.361)	0.269 (0.139)	-0.441 (0.402)	-0.053 (0.157)
I earn more x I do more	-0.218 (0.144)	-0.016 (0.121)	-0.215 (0.160)	-0.003 (0.137)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	0.026 (0.331)	0.245 (0.179)	0.395 (0.368)	0.522** (0.202)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.002 (0.114)	-0.052 (0.152)	-0.110 (0.127)	0.369* (0.172)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.529*** (0.087)	-0.453*** (0.089)	-0.262** (0.097)	-0.142 (0.101)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.214*** (0.102)	-1.280*** (0.109)	-0.695*** (0.115)	-0.529*** (0.123)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-1.838*** (0.190)	-2.100*** (0.202)	-1.240*** (0.214)	-1.409*** (0.230)
Respondent's age	-0.062 (0.035)	-0.055 (0.045)	-0.074* (0.043)	-0.107* (0.053)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001* (0.001)
Respondent currently employed	0.046 (0.065)	0.239** (0.077)	-0.088 (0.073)	-0.087 (0.088)
Partner currently employed	0.147* (0.073)	0.053 (0.066)	0.206* (0.083)	0.034 (0.075)
Respondent Highly Educated	0.025 (0.075)	0.042 (0.081)	-0.200* (0.088)	-0.040 (0.093)
Partner Highly Educated	0.091 (0.074)	0.103 (0.077)	0.202* (0.085)	0.055 (0.088)
Childcare responsibilities	0.101 (0.076)	-0.0287 (0.078)	-0.262** (0.089)	-0.148 (0.089)
Constant	8.239*** (0.714)	8.101*** (1.002)	9.414*** (0.868)	9.922*** (1.165)
Observations	4,849	3,757	4,849	3,757
Number of individuals	1,543	1,154	1,543	1,154

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses

Table A4. Results of the Models With Moderation for Individuals Without Childcare Responsibilities

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partnership Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.119 (0.162)	0.120 (0.107)	-0.047 (0.174)	0.160 (0.118)
My partner earns more	-0.078 (0.130)	-0.185 (0.137)	0.145 (0.140)	-0.069 (0.151)
<i>Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
Partner does more	0.036 (0.384)	-0.321* (0.157)	-0.250 (0.412)	-0.347* (0.172)
I do more	0.011 (0.132)	-0.048 (0.135)	-0.304* (0.141)	-0.005 (0.149)
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same) x Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
I earn more x Partner does more	0.024 (0.498)	0.368* (0.183)	0.283 (0.534)	0.192 (0.201)
I earn more x I do more	-0.082 (0.190)	-0.151 (0.162)	-0.045 (0.203)	-0.098 (0.178)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.100 (0.475)	0.220 (0.225)	0.081 (0.510)	0.717** (0.246)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.024 (0.156)	-0.048 (0.194)	-0.089 (0.167)	0.182 (0.213)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.521*** (0.121)	-0.590*** (0.127)	-0.234 (0.131)	-0.192 (0.141)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.180*** (0.143)	-1.520*** (0.151)	-0.615*** (0.156)	-0.551** (0.168)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-1.954*** (0.293)	-2.934*** (0.289)	-1.622*** (0.317)	-1.387*** (0.322)
Respondent's age	-0.032 (0.044)	-0.104 (0.057)	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.144* (0.068)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Respondent currently employed	0.042 (0.103)	0.130 (0.098)	-0.120 (0.114)	-0.182 (0.110)
Partner currently employed	0.029 (0.096)	0.126 (0.089)	0.163 (0.105)	0.067 (0.099)
Respondent Highly Educated	0.087 (0.108)	0.062 (0.111)	-0.188 (0.122)	-0.035 (0.128)
Partner Highly Educated	0.126 (0.105)	0.095 (0.104)	0.158 (0.117)	0.113 (0.118)
Constant	7.635*** (0.895)	9.217*** (1.271)	9.283*** (1.056)	10.71*** (1.514)
Observations	2,391	2,114	2,391	2,114
Number of individuals	855	726	855	726

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses

Table A5. Results of the Models With Moderation for Individuals With Childcare Responsibilities – Housework

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partnership Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.203 (0.192)	0.102 (0.124)	-0.103 (0.219)	-0.060 (0.144)
My partner earns more	0.040 (0.149)	-0.332 (0.176)	0.047 (0.171)	-0.763*** (0.204)
<i>Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
Partner does more	0.087 (0.370)	-0.205 (0.186)	-0.496 (0.420)	0.231 (0.216)
I do more	-0.036 (0.147)	-0.080 (0.157)	-0.120 (0.167)	-0.218 (0.183)
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same) x Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
I earn more x Partner does more	0.541 (0.565)	0.163 (0.211)	0.846 (0.644)	-0.284 (0.246)
I earn more x I do more	-0.413 (0.224)	0.090 (0.183)	-0.485 (0.254)	0.188 (0.213)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	0.242 (0.487)	0.488 (0.296)	0.901 (0.553)	0.475 (0.345)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.033 (0.172)	-0.012 (0.245)	-0.097 (0.196)	0.685* (0.285)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.593*** (0.126)	-0.333** (0.124)	-0.317* (0.144)	-0.073 (0.144)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.362*** (0.148)	-1.023*** (0.156)	-0.866*** (0.170)	-0.479** (0.181)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-1.797*** (0.255)	-1.519*** (0.283)	-1.046*** (0.291)	-1.548*** (0.328)
Respondent's age	-0.079 (0.059)	0.044 (0.073)	-0.121 (0.073)	-0.056 (0.084)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Respondent currently employed	0.045 (0.087)	0.406** (0.129)	-0.122 (0.100)	0.091 (0.150)
Partner currently employed	0.270* (0.114)	-0.020 (0.100)	0.192 (0.130)	-0.046 (0.116)
Respondent Highly Educated	-0.075 (0.105)	-0.021 (0.117)	-0.217 (0.124)	-0.132 (0.136)
Partner Highly Educated	0.071 (0.102)	0.106 (0.112)	0.219 (0.120)	0.005 (0.130)
Constant	8.819*** (1.202)	5.892*** (1.606)	9.738*** (1.490)	8.679*** (1.839)
Observations	2,458	1,643	2,458	1,643
Number of individuals	834	565	834	565

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses

Table A6. Results of the Models With Moderation for Individuals With Childcare Responsibilities – Childcare

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partnership Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	-0.061 (0.175)	0.246* (0.106)	-0.328 (0.205)	-0.003 (0.123)
My partner earns more	0.009 (0.131)	-0.115 (0.145)	0.001 (0.153)	-0.324 (0.168)
<i>Childcare Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
Partner does more	-0.137 (0.307)	0.146 (0.206)	0.291 (0.358)	0.243 (0.239)
I do more	-0.076 (0.135)	0.363* (0.181)	-0.244 (0.157)	0.008 (0.211)
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same) x Childcare Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
I earn more x Partner does more	0.435 (0.468)	-0.137 (0.227)	0.134 (0.545)	-0.319 (0.264)
I earn more x I do more	0.017 (0.210)	-0.500* (0.209)	-0.094 (0.244)	-0.116 (0.243)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	0.336 (0.373)	-0.305 (0.296)	-0.180 (0.434)	-0.411 (0.344)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.030 (0.157)	-0.600* (0.288)	-0.006 (0.183)	-0.080 (0.334)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.629*** (0.121)	-0.343** (0.120)	-0.320* (0.141)	-0.121 (0.139)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.376*** (0.142)	-0.985*** (0.151)	-0.901*** (0.167)	-0.483** (0.175)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-1.820*** (0.246)	-1.457*** (0.275)	-1.179*** (0.288)	-1.474*** (0.319)
Respondent's age	-0.087 (0.058)	0.040 (0.073)	-0.127 (0.071)	-0.057 (0.084)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Respondent currently employed	0.055 (0.0841)	0.390** (0.126)	-0.100 (0.099)	0.064 (0.146)
Partner currently employed	0.269* (0.108)	0.015 (0.097)	0.235 (0.126)	-0.006 (0.112)
Respondent Highly Educated	0.012 (0.103)	-0.054 (0.115)	-0.167 (0.123)	-0.138 (0.133)
Partner Highly Educated	0.024 (0.010)	0.131 (0.110)	0.163 (0.119)	-0.003 (0.127)
Constant	9.068*** (1.173)	5.781*** (1.604)	9.820*** (1.447)	8.602*** (1.832)
Observations	2,640	1,751	2,640	1,751
Number of individuals	846	570	846	570

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, standard errors in parentheses

Table A7. Results of the Models Without Moderation – COVID vs. Post-Covid Waves

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partner Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.045 (0.103)	0.143 (0.086)	-0.111 (0.114)	0.105 (0.100)
	0.100 (0.111)	0.158 (0.093)	-0.266* (0.135)	0.033 (0.106)
My partner earns more	-0.064 (0.084)	-0.103 (0.111)	0.016 (0.093)	0.015 (0.128)
	-0.088 (0.089)	-0.381** (0.117)	-0.129 (0.108)	-0.288* (0.133)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.657*** (0.119)	-0.559*** (0.123)	-0.421*** (0.131)	-0.218 (0.143)
	-0.660*** (0.126)	-0.500*** (0.126)	-0.127 (0.153)	-0.380** (0.142)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.448*** (0.137)	-1.535*** (0.146)	-0.974*** (0.151)	-0.713*** (0.169)
	-1.408*** (0.148)	-1.460*** (0.155)	-0.584*** (0.180)	-0.806*** (0.175)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-2.018*** (0.249)	-2.242*** (0.262)	-1.543*** (0.271)	-1.551*** (0.303)
	-2.588*** (0.287)	-2.497*** (0.322)	-1.898*** (0.349)	-2.120*** (0.367)
Respondent's age	-0.053 (0.080)	-0.032 (0.051)	-0.056 (0.046)	-0.072 (0.056)
	-0.60 (0.040)	-0.062 (0.050)	-0.082 (0.049)	-0.115 (0.061)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Respondent currently employed	0.006 (0.083)	0.233* (0.098)	-0.064 (0.092)	-0.092 (0.113)
	-0.011 (0.094)	0.111 (0.121)	0.066 (0.115)	-0.023 (0.141)
Partner currently employed	0.126 (0.097)	-0.029 (0.085)	0.126 (0.107)	0.080 (0.098)
	0.324 ** (0.107)	0.039 (0.096)	0.413** (0.127)	0.013 (0.110)
Respondent highly educated	0.071 (0.085)	0.014 (0.094)	-0.215* (0.097)	-0.144 (0.107)
	0.084 (0.103)	-0.040 (0.109)	-0.109 (0.127)	-0.148 (0.132)
Partner highly educated	0.009 (0.089)	0.110 (0.093)	0.181 (0.100)	0.092 (0.106)
	0.074 (0.102)	0.200 (0.109)	0.218 (0.125)	0.146 (0.129)
Childcare responsibilities	0.107 (0.094)	-0.068 (0.102)	-0.339** (0.111)	-0.272* (0.115)
	0.122 (0.097)	0.065 (0.105)	-0.366** (0.119)	0.061 (0.124)
Constant	8.240*** (0.766)	7.827*** (1.114)	9.255*** (0.923)	9.276*** (1.230)
	8.089*** (0.806)	8.173*** (1.096)	8.828*** (0.992)	9.844*** (1.336)
Observations	2,974	2,217	2,974	2,217
	2,393	1,871	2,393	1,871
	1,513	1,129	1,513	1,129
Number of individuals	1,509	1,134	1,509	1,134

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses, for each effect, the first row presents pandemic effects (waves 2021–2022) and the second row presents post-pandemic effects (waves 2023–2024).

Table A8. Results of the Models With Moderation – COVID vs. Post-Covid Waves

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partnership Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.219 (0.183)	0.032 (0.117)	0.075 (0.199)	0.033 (0.138)
	0.388* (0.186)	0.116 (0.125)	-0.206 (0.219)	0.030 (0.141)
My partner earns more	0.011 (0.150)	-0.075 (0.160)	0.055 (0.164)	-0.420* (0.188)
	-0.011 (0.142)	-0.523*** (0.162)	-0.122 (0.167)	-0.458* (0.183)
<i>Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
Partner does more	0.354 (0.356)	-0.345 (0.186)	-0.385 (0.383)	-0.158 (0.222)
	0.216 (0.459)	0.234 (0.209)	0.222 (0.542)	-0.255 (0.200)
I do more	0.198 (0.144)	-0.018 (0.136)	-0.207 (0.156)	-0.040 (0.161)
	-0.207 (0.149)	-0.001 (0.254)	-0.475** (0.176)	-0.567* (0.233)
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same) x Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
I earn more x Partner does more	-0.244 (0.522)	0.442* (0.216)	0.187 (0.562)	0.124 (0.257)
	0.002 (0.594)	0.234 (0.209)	0.738 (0.702)	0.083 (0.233)
I earn more x I do more	-0.290 (0.211)	0.011 (0.160)	-0.257 (0.228)	0.043 (0.190)
	-0.452* (0.228)	-0.001 (0.254)	-0.170 (0.269)	0.020 (0.284)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.498 (0.461)	0.265 (0.294)	0.450 (0.498)	1.040** (0.350)
	0.417 (0.580)	0.372 (0.259)	0.073 (0.685)	0.561 (0.287)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.118 (0.171)	-0.159 (0.206)	-0.057 (0.186)	0.526* (0.244)
	-0.033 (0.178)	0.106 (0.304)	0.060 (0.210)	-0.057 (0.341)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.623*** (0.123)	-0.558*** (0.128)	-0.474*** (0.135)	-0.205 (0.150)
	-0.657*** (0.133)	-0.499*** (0.135)	-0.090 (0.157)	-0.294 (0.153)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.440*** (0.141)	-1.524*** (0.153)	-1.051*** (0.157)	-0.725*** (0.178)
	-1.430*** (0.155)	-1.523*** (0.164)	-0.637*** (0.185)	-0.828*** (0.187)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-1.977*** (0.260)	-2.344*** (0.268)	-1.485*** (0.284)	-1.615*** (0.313)
	-2.514*** (0.301)	-2.722*** (0.335)	-1.790*** (0.358)	-2.195*** (0.383)
Respondent's age	-0.046 (0.039)	-0.023 (0.051)	-0.059 (0.047)	-0.067 (0.057)
	-0.072 (0.042)	-0.066 (0.052)	-0.05 (0.052)	-0.113 (0.063)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Respondent currently employed	0.017 (0.085)	0.266*** (0.100)	-0.044 (0.096)	-0.083 (0.117)
	-0.056 (0.102)	0.128 (0.127)	-0.031 (0.122)	-0.009 (0.148)
Partner currently employed	0.043 (0.101)	-0.041 (0.088)	0.105 (0.112)	0.019 (0.102)
	0.370*** (0.116)	0.062 (0.101)	0.433** (0.138)	0.020 (0.116)
Respondent Highly Educated	0.029 (0.088)	0.030 (0.096)	-0.234* (0.100)	-0.102 (0.110)
	0.015 (0.108)	-0.104 (0.112)	-0.214 (0.132)	-0.240 (0.135)
Partner Highly Educated	0.061 (0.092)	0.066 (0.095)	0.201 (0.103)	0.050 (0.110)
	0.090 (0.108)	0.217 (0.112)	0.200 (0.130)	0.173 (0.132)
Childcare responsibilities	0.057 (0.097)	-0.064 (0.104)	-0.364*** (0.114)	-0.318** (0.118)
	0.066 (0.102)	0.101 (0.109)	-0.346** (0.123)	-0.014 (0.128)
Constant	8.095*** (0.795)	7.741*** (1.136)	9.600*** (0.950)	9.418*** (1.258)
	8.577*** (0.865)	8.372*** (1.138)	8.664*** (1.055)	10.070*** (1.380)
Observations	2,769	2,080	2,769	2,080
	2,080	1,677	2,080	1,677
	1,501	1,121	1,501	1,121
Number of individuals	1,364	1,053	1,364	1,053

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses, for each effect, the first row presents pandemic effects (waves 2021–2022) and the second row presents post-pandemic effects (waves 2023–2024).

Table A9. Marginal Effects for Relative Income and Housework Interaction – COVID vs. Post-Covid Waves

Marginal Effects of Relative income (Ref. Cat. <i>We earn about the same</i>) x Housework Division Interaction	Life Satisfaction		Partner Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
I earn more x We do about the same	0.219 (0.183)	0.032 (0.117)	0.075 (0.199)	0.033 (0.138)
	0.388* (0.186)	0.116 (0.125)	-0.206 (0.219)	0.030 (0.141)
I earn more x Partner does more	-0.025 (0.494)	0.474* (0.194)	0.262 (0.533)	0.157 (0.230)
	0.390 (0.572)	0.349* (0.178)	0.532 (0.677)	0.113 (0.199)
I earn more x I do more	-0.071 (0.125)	0.043 (0.129)	-0.182 (0.137)	0.076 (0.151)
	-0.064 (0.149)	0.107 (0.229)	-0.376* (0.177)	0.050 (0.257)
My partner earns more x We do about the same	0.011 (0.150)	-0.075 (0.160)	0.055 (0.164)	-0.420* (0.188)
	-0.011 (0.142)	-0.526*** (0.162)	-0.122 (0.167)	-0.458* (0.183)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.488 (0.442)	0.191 (0.261)	0.505 (0.478)	0.620* (0.310)
	0.406 (0.571)	-0.154 (0.216)	-0.050 (0.675)	0.102 (0.241)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.108 (0.101)	-0.234 (0.157)	-0.002 (0.112)	0.105 (0.185)
	-0.044 (0.120)	-0.420 (0.271)	-0.062 (0.143)	-0.515 (0.306)

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses, for each effect, the first row presents pandemic effects (waves 2021–2022) and the second row presents post-pandemic effects (waves 2023–2024).

Table A10. Results of the Models Without Moderation – Sample Restricted to Currently Employed

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partner Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.026 (0.086)	0.158** (0.069)	-0.213** (0.100)	0.010 (0.080)
My partner earns more	-0.085 (0.067)	-0.097 (0.089)	-0.011 (0.078)	-0.117 (0.103)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.535*** (0.097)	-0.476*** (0.096)	-0.206* (0.113)	-0.137 (0.110)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.239*** (0.119)	-1.328*** (0.124)	-0.665*** (0.139)	-0.468*** (0.143)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-2.267*** (0.281)	-2.056*** (0.299)	-1.994*** (0.329)	-2.051*** (0.345)
Respondent's age	-0.041 (0.042)	-0.022 (0.052)	-0.078 (0.052)	-0.130** (0.061)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Respondent Highly Educated	0.048 (0.089)	0.089 (0.093)	-0.177* (0.107)	-0.035 (0.109)
Partner Highly Educated	0.096 (0.083)	0.071 (0.087)	0.240** (0.099)	-0.045 (0.102)
Childcare responsibilities	0.079 (0.086)	-0.068 (0.087)	-0.349*** (0.104)	-0.136 (0.102)
Constant	8.016*** (0.843)	7.709*** (1.129)	9.336*** (1.055)	10.32*** (1.339)
Observations	3,310	2,528	3,310	2,528
Number of individuals	1,174	872	1,174	872

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses

Table A11. Results of the Models With Moderation – Sample Restricted to Currently Employed

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partnership Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.169 (0.153)	0.122 (0.093)	-0.097 (0.174)	0.006 (0.108)
My partner earns more	-0.047 (0.111)	-0.124 (0.128)	0.075 (0.126)	-0.365* (0.148)
<i>Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
Partner does more	0.283 (0.323)	-0.264 (0.140)	0.059 (0.366)	-0.173 (0.162)
I do more	-0.069 (0.108)	-0.114 (0.114)	-0.307* (0.123)	-0.078 (0.132)
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same) x Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
I earn more x Partner does more	0.036 (0.460)	0.174 (0.168)	0.317 (0.523)	0.029 (0.195)
I earn more x I do more	-0.260 (0.178)	0.085 (0.141)	-0.174 (0.202)	0.034 (0.163)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.466 (0.417)	0.216 (0.216)	-0.126 (0.473)	0.723** (0.250)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.035 (0.132)	-0.029 (0.174)	-0.050 (0.150)	0.261 (0.201)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.526*** (0.102)	-0.458*** (0.101)	-0.260** (0.117)	-0.069 (0.117)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.258*** (0.125)	-1.346*** (0.130)	-0.738*** (0.143)	-0.449** (0.151)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-2.442*** (0.299)	-2.104*** (0.309)	-1.814*** (0.343)	-2.074*** (0.358)
Respondent's age	-0.042 (0.044)	-0.010 (0.053)	-0.066 (0.054)	-0.125* (0.062)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Respondent Highly Educated	0.022 (0.092)	0.088 (0.096)	-0.194 (0.110)	-0.068 (0.112)
Partner Highly Educated	0.090 (0.087)	0.049 (0.091)	0.227* (0.102)	-0.030 (0.105)
Childcare responsibilities	0.105 (0.089)	-0.065 (0.090)	-0.318** (0.106)	-0.146 (0.105)
Constant	8.083*** (0.885)	7.500*** (1.165)	9.328*** (1.092)	10.265*** (1.368)
Observations	3,012	2,313	3,012	2,313
Number of individuals	1,136	855	1,136	855

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses

Table A12. Marginal Effects for Relative Income and Housework Interaction – Sample Restricted to Currently Employed

Marginal Effects of Relative income (Ref. Cat. <i>We earn about the same</i>) x Housework Division Interaction	Life Satisfaction		Partner Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
I earn more x We do about the same	0.169 (0.153)	0.122 (0.093)	-0.097 (0.174)	0.006 (0.108)
I earn more x Partner does more	0.205 (0.443)	0.296* (0.149)	0.220 (0.503)	0.034 (0.173)
I earn more x I do more	-0.091 (0.107)	0.207 (0.118)	-0.271* (0.123)	0.040 (0.137)
My partner earns more x We do about the same	-0.047 (0.111)	-0.124 (0.127)	0.075 (0.126)	-0.365* (0.148)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.513 (0.405)	0.092 (0.187)	-0.051 (0.460)	0.358 (0.217)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.081 (0.086)	-0.153 (0.143)	0.025 (0.098)	-0.105 (0.166)

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses

Table A13. Results of the Models With Moderation – Broad Definition of Housework Division Equity

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partnership Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.060 (0.109)	0.115 (0.073)	-0.161 (0.123)	0.019 (0.083)
My partner earns more	-0.015 (0.085)	-0.275** (0.095)	0.085 (0.096)	-0.256* (0.108)
<i>Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
Partner does more	-0.121 (0.336)	-0.373** (0.145)	-0.302 (0.373)	-0.230 (0.164)
I do more	-0.041 (0.093)	-0.070 (0.113)	-0.200 (0.104)	-0.127 (0.127)
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same) x Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
I earn more x Partner does more	0.688 (0.439)	0.365* (0.166)	0.505 (0.488)	0.210 (0.187)
I earn more x I do more	-0.128 (0.137)	-0.024 (0.132)	-0.138 (0.152)	0.072 (0.149)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.005 (0.429)	0.537* (0.214)	0.114 (0.477)	0.532* (0.241)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.051 (0.108)	0.068 (0.163)	-0.160 (0.121)	0.432* (0.185)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.526*** (0.086)	-0.455*** (0.089)	-0.255** (0.097)	-0.135 (0.101)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.213*** (0.102)	-1.276*** (0.109)	-0.695*** (0.115)	-0.520*** (0.123)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-1.830*** (0.191)	-2.107*** (0.203)	-1.227*** (0.214)	-1.400*** (0.230)
Respondent's age	-0.062 (0.035)	-0.054 (0.045)	-0.073 (0.043)	-0.107* (0.053)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001* (0.001)
Respondent currently employed	0.041 (0.065)	0.233** (0.077)	-0.097 (0.073)	-0.089 (0.088)
Partner currently employed	0.143 (0.073)	0.052 (0.066)	0.203* (0.083)	0.030 (0.075)
Respondent Highly Educated	0.021 (0.075)	0.048 (0.081)	-0.211* (0.088)	-0.038 (0.094)
Partner Highly Educated	0.084 (0.074)	0.103 (0.077)	0.192* (0.085)	0.052 (0.088)
Childcare responsibilities	0.106 (0.076)	-0.032 (0.078)	-0.259** (0.088)	-0.144 (0.089)
Constant	8.266*** (0.713)	8.076*** (0.999)	9.402*** (0.865)	9.919*** (1.165)
Observations	4,849	3,757	4,849	3,757
Number of individuals	1,543	1,154	1,543	1,154

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, standard errors in parentheses, “we do about the same” level in housework division consists of individuals whose housework index is between 0.35 and 0.65

Table A14. Marginal Effects for Relative Income and Housework Interaction – Broad Definition of Housework Division Equity

Marginal Effects of Relative income (Ref. Cat. <i>We earn about the same</i>) x Housework Division Interaction	Life Satisfaction		Partner Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
I earn more x We do about the same	0.060 (0.109)	0.114 (0.073)	-0.161 (0.123)	0.019 (0.083)
I earn more x Partner does more	0.748 (0.429)	0.479** (0.156)	0.344 (0.478)	0.230 (0.176)
I earn more x I do more	-0.067 (0.098)	0.090 (0.121)	-0.300** (0.110)	0.091 (0.137)
My partner earns more x We do about the same	-0.015 (0.085)	-0.275** (0.095)	0.085 (0.100)	-0.256* (0.108)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.019 (0.424)	0.262 (0.201)	0.199 (0.472)	0.276 (0.226)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.066 (0.079)	-0.207 (0.147)	-0.075 (0.089)	0.176 (0.166)

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses, “we do about the same” level in housework division consists of individuals whose housework index is between 0.35 and 0.65

Table A15. Results of the Models With Moderation – Narrow Definition of Housework Division Equity

Variables	Life Satisfaction		Partnership Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same)</i>				
I earn more	0.064 (0.161)	0.150 (0.101)	-0.133 (0.180)	0.174 (0.115)
My partner earns more	-0.004 (0.125)	-0.192 (0.140)	0.033 (0.139)	-0.248 (0.158)
<i>Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
Partner does more	0.224 (0.189)	-0.167 (0.115)	-0.230 (0.210)	0.068 (0.129)
I do more	-0.077 (0.114)	-0.069 (0.102)	-0.230 (0.127)	0.028 (0.116)
<i>Relative income (Ref. Cat. We earn about the same) x Housework Division (Ref. Cat. We do about the same)</i>				
I earn more x Partner does more	-0.112 (0.269)	0.126 (0.135)	0.311 (0.298)	-0.194 (0.152)
I earn more x I do more	-0.060 (0.175)	-0.084 (0.123)	-0.159 (0.194)	-0.150 (0.139)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.154 (0.238)	0.103 (0.182)	0.239 (0.264)	0.314 (0.205)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.034 (0.136)	-0.074 (0.163)	-0.067 (0.151)	0.127 (0.184)
<i>Subjective assessment of material situation (Ref. Cat. Living comfortably on present income)</i>				
Coping on present income	-0.535*** (0.0864)	-0.458*** (0.0889)	-0.273** (0.0970)	-0.139 (0.101)
Finding it difficult on present income	-1.222*** (0.102)	-1.284*** (0.109)	-0.709*** (0.115)	-0.532*** (0.123)
Finding it very difficult on present income	-1.836*** (0.190)	-2.099*** (0.202)	-1.256*** (0.214)	-1.415*** (0.230)
Respondent's age	-0.062 (0.035)	-0.056 (0.045)	-0.075 (0.043)	-0.108** (0.053)
Respondent's age, squared	0.001* (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Respondent currently employed	0.040 (0.065)	0.239** (0.078)	-0.085 (0.073)	-0.083 (0.088)
Partner currently employed	0.155* (0.073)	0.056 (0.066)	0.204* (0.083)	0.029 (0.075)
Respondent Highly Educated	0.024 (0.075)	0.040 (0.081)	-0.197* (0.088)	-0.048 (0.094)
Partner Highly Educated	0.087 (0.073)	0.101 (0.077)	0.216** (0.085)	0.050 (0.088)
Childcare responsibilities	0.102 (0.076)	-0.023 (0.078)	-0.269** (0.089)	-0.142 (0.089)
Constant	8.275*** (0.716)	8.119*** (1.004)	9.514*** (0.872)	9.868*** (1.170)
Observations	4,849	3,757	4,849	3,757
Number of individuals	1,543	1,154	1,543	1,154

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, standard errors in parentheses, "we do about the same" level in housework division consists of individuals whose housework index is between 0.45 and 0.55

Table A16. Marginal Effects for Relative Income and Housework Interaction – Broad Definition of Housework Division Equity

Marginal Effects of Relative income (Ref. Cat. <i>We earn about the same</i>) x Housework Division Interaction	Life Satisfaction		Partner Satisfaction	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
I earn more x We do about the same	0.064 (0.161)	0.150 (0.101)	-0.133 (0.180)	0.174 (0.115)
I earn more x Partner does more	-0.047 (0.229)	0.276* (0.101)	0.178 (0.255)	-0.020 (0.114)
I earn more x I do more	0.004 (0.086)	0.066 (0.089)	-0.292** (0.097)	0.024 (0.100)
My partner earns more x We do about the same	-0.004 (0.125)	-0.192 (0.140)	0.033 (0.139)	-0.248 (0.158)
My partner earns more x Partner does more	-0.159 (0.212)	-0.089 (0.131)	0.272 (0.236)	0.066 (0.148)
My partner earns more x I do more	-0.038 (0.069)	-0.266* (0.110)	-0.034 (0.078)	-0.121 (0.124)

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, standard errors in parentheses, “we do about the same” level in housework division consists of individuals whose housework index is between 0.45 and 0.55



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